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Over the past two decades, the franchising industry has 
experienced a phase of renewed expansion and contin-
ued growth, spurred to a large extent by the advent of 
new forms of franchising. New industry segments, such 
as funeral homes and car repair garages, have adopted 
franchising as a means to conduct business based on its 
standardization promise, and the expansion into so-
called 'non-traditional' sites. such as airports, colleges 
and hospitals, has allowed for another push in the 
growth of franchise systems. In the wake of globaliza-
tion, which accounted for much of the industry's 
expansion between the 1960s and 1980s, a major portion 
of the more recent increase in sales and unit growth can 
be attributed to the emergence of franchise owners who 
own more than the traditional single outlet (Kaufmann, 
1992). In many cases, such multi-unit franchisees' mini-
chains extend across entire states, encompassing 
hundreds of outlets (Kaufmann, 1988; Bodipo-Memba 
and Lee, 1997). In contrast, Bond's Franchise Guide 
(1998) provides figures that put the median size of entire 
franchise systems at only 64 outlets. With half of today's 
retail goods being distributed through franchise systems, 
the trend towards multi-unit franchising has become a 
pervasive phenomenon. 
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However, ownership attention as the core advantage 
of franchising for the franchisor seems to get lost in a 
multi-unit ownership arrangement. In addition, franchise 
ownership of multiple outlets seems to represent, at best, 
an equivalent solution to other types of capital invest-
ment, and at worst, an inferior alternative in light of the 
stock markets' continued surge paired with semi-
dependence on the ffanchiser. A clear need exists for 
entrepreneurship researchers to understand the emer-
gence of such important and pervasive institutions as the 
new breed of multi-unit franchise businesses; this article 
is considered a step in this direction. 
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First, an overview of the history and broad character-
istics of traditional franchising in contrast to the more 
modern phenomenon of multi-unit franchising is 
provided. Then, the 'multi-unit franchising paradox' will 
be outlined. Multi-unit franchising will be examined, 
offering suggestions why multi-unit franchisees might 
be interested in this particular business arrangement. 
Hence, a distinct focus will be placed on the discussion 
as to why multi-unit franchising may exist from the 
franchisee's perspective, and on entrepreneurship as a 
possible motive for sequential owners for their involve-
ment as multi-unit franchisees. Multi-unit franchising 
seems to be such a pervasive phenomenon today that the 
question of why those involved engage in this endeavour 
seems not just warranted, but almost overdue. The 
franchising industry in the USA serves as the basis for 
the conceptual exploration of this paper, due to its 
advanced development compared with less mature 
franchise markets around the globe. 
Historical overview 
Franchising as a distinct form of distribution goes back 
to the early 1800s, when beer brewers in Europe entered 
into licensing and financing agreements with bars and 
taverns for the exclusive sale of various types of beer 
and ale. In 1863, the Singer Sewing Machine Company 
instituted the first consumer product franchise system in 
the USA. During the 1890s, the automobile and soft 
drink industries adopted franchising as the primary 
means of distribution, and in the 1930s, petroleum 
producers followed (Hackett, 1976). The marketing and 
the economics literatures classify this 'first generation' 
of franchise systems, which was adopted early on and 
continues to the present, as 'product and tradename 
franchising'. It is characterized by franchisees who 
simply distribute a product under a franchisor's trade-
mark (Preble and Hoffman, 1998). 
The franchise industry began a period of accelerated 
growth in the 1950s. After Howard Johnson had devel-
oped the first franchised restaurant chain in 1935, 
fast-food restaurants, hotels, entertainment and rental 
services integrated the franchising concept into their 
marketing strategy (Hackett, 1976). With these newer 
types of franchise systems, the main focus shifted from 
the traditional perspective of a distribution channel for a 
trademarked product to that of ownership of an entire 
business idea by the franchisor, and its rental to the 
franchisee (Caves and Murphy, 1976). This 'second 
generation' of franchising is defined as 'business format 
franchising' in which the relationship between 
franchisor and franchisee 'includes not only the product, 
service, and trademark, but the entire business format 
itself- a marketing strategy and plan, operating 
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manuals and standards, quality control, and continuing 
two-way communication' (US Department of Com-
merce, 1988: 3). By the late 1960s, the initial rapid 
growth of franchising within the USA had levelled off 
due to an increasing perception of market saturation and 
heightened competition. Consequently, franchisors 
began to expand beyond US borders. While in 1969 
only 14% of the members of the International 
Franchise Association (!FA) had foreign operations 
(Hackett, 1976), today more than 20% of established 
franchise chains, approximately 400 companies, have 
globalized their franchises (Ryans, Lotz, and Maskulka, 
1997). 
During the past decade or so, the face of the domestic 
franchise industry has changed dramatically. An ever 
growing number of franchisees has established multi-
unit operations within existing franchise systems, with 
various forms of multiple-unit ownership emerging. The 
following section will provide an overview of some of 
the more important types of single-unit as well as multi-
unit ownership. 
Franchising characteristics and types 
Much confusion still surrounds the concept of 
franchising despite the fact that it is a long established 
business arrangement. This arises from the variety of 
business relationships that closely resemble franchising, 
and the common use of the term in everyday language. 
The franchising industry has summed up the dual 
benefits of franchising as a hybrid between dependence 
and autonomy in the catchy slogan, 'Be in business for 
yourself, but not by yourself.' It is usually assumed 
explicitly or implicitly that franchising is a distinct and 
well defined category somewhere between complete 
vertical integration and autonomous firms. 
From a distribution standpoint, there are actually a 
number of alternative organizational forms between the 
two extremes. Apart from franchising as a contractual 
vertical marketing system, examples of distribution 
channel hybrids include administered vertical distribu-
tion systems, and strategic alliances. The possible hybrid 
organizational forms are so numerous that they are best 
thought of as existing on a continuum. Franchises are 
not a single point along the continuum, but rather 
constitute an alternative to each of the organizational 
types along the continuum. Thus, there exist no neat 
boundaries between franchises and other business forms. 
A franchise contract obligates the franchisee to 
distribute products and/or services under the franchisor's 
trademark. The franchisee agrees to follow certain 
guidelines and operating standards, and pays an entry 
fee, royalties and various other recurring fees, in return 
for the franchisor's advice and services regarding site 
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selection, financing, advertising, litigation and so forth. 
A variety of franchise forms coexists under the same 
name. However, the traditional perception of franchising 
is the 'mom and pop' franchisee, who brings all of her/ 
his energy and focus to bear on operating one outlet 
(Caves and Murphy, 1976). 
In recent years, practitioners' as well as researchers' 
attention has begun to focus on a new development in 
franchising, the trend towards multi-unit franchising. In 
contrast to the historic 'mom and pop' franchisee, an 
ever growing number of franchise owners currently 
operates more than one outlet. Over the past few years, 
various studies have indicated the persistent importance 
of multi-unit franchising in the USA. Kaufmann and 
Dant (1996) found that 88% of the surveyed franchisors 
had multi-unit franchisees, while Kaufmann (1995) 
found that 83% of the surveyed new Mexican restaurants 
in 1994 were opened by existing franchisees. Within the 
McDonald's franchise system, between 1980 and 1990, 
61.5% of all new restaurants were opened by existing 
franchisees (Kaufmann and Lafontaine, 1994). Conse-
quently, Kaufmann and Dant (1996: 346-347) conclude 
that 'the typical location-based franchise system (of 
which the fast food franchise is the prime and model 
example) is populated with multi-unit franchisees.' 
Further, based on various recent studies (eg Kaufmann 
and Kim, 1993 and 1995; Robicheaux, Dant, and 
Kaufmann, 1994), it can be concluded that the 
franchising sector as a whole is not only growing, but 
that a substantial portion of the industry's growth can be 
attributed to the increasing popularity of multi-unit 
franchising. 
Kaufmann and his colleagues (Kaufmann and Dant, 
1996; Kaufmann and Kim, 1993 and 1995) identify 
three types of multi-unit franchisees, apart from the 
traditional single-unit franchisee. 'Subfranchising ', 
often also denoted as 'master franchising', is character-
ized by the franchisor's permission to a franchisee to 
grant franchises on the ti:anchisor's behalf to third 
parties. Subfranchising as a distinct form of franchising 
is widely used in the international expansion efforts of 
franchisors. Often, a subfranchisor for one or even 
several countries is established who then in turn 
subfranchises to local franchisees who ar'e respo~sible 
for opening their units. The subfranchisor functions as 
an additional control layer, and largely assumes the tasks 
of the franchisor in her/his geographical area for a share 
of the royalty payments. Subfranchising as well as 
corporate ownership of outlets by the franchisor have 
been in the past, and are still today among the most 
frequently observed forms of control in the international 
expansion process of US franchise systems (eg Alon and 
Banru, 2000). Either strategy allows the franchisor a 
great amount of control over its foreign operations, a 
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paramount objective for franchisors in light of the 
prevailing communication and strategic flexibility 
problems in global franchisor/franchisee relationships 
(Ryans et al, 1997). 
'Area development ti:anchising' as well as 'sequential 
multi-unit franchising' denote the types of franchising in 
which the franchisee her/himself opens additional units 
under her/his own ownership and management. They are 
the prevalent types of franchising in the USA 
(Robicheaux et al, 1994), with sequential multi-unit 
franchising as the most common domestic form 
(Kaufmann, 1992). In area development franchising, the 
franchisor requires the franchisee her/himself to exercise 
the contractual obligation to open a specified number of 
outlets within a specified period of time. In sequential 
multi-unit franchising, the franchisor simply grants the 
franchisee the right to open additional units, with each 
subsequent outlet being legally governed by a separate 
franchise agreement. This franchise form is based on the 
desire by traditional single-unit franchisees to open 
additional units in order to grow their businesses, and 
qualification for expansion is often based on the per-
formance of existing units (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996). 
Both of these types of multi-unit franchising actively 
encourage the creation of mini-chains, ie multiple units 
owned by the franchisee and operated by employee-
managers of the franchisee. 
Multi-unit franchising, either through incremental 
expansion by the franchisee one unit at a time, or 
through the contractual agreement to open multiple 
units contained in an area development contract, 
creates a collection of mini-chains within the franchise 
system. Both Kaufmann (1988) and Bodipo-Memba 
and Lee (1997) indicate that these mini-chains in 
some cases extend across entire states, and may 
encompass hundreds of outlets. Area development 
contracts force area developers to approach their 
assigned territory in a systematic fashion, thus 
accelerating the growth process. Area developers 
generally operate within a specified exclusive 
territory, which is defined in their contract with the 
franchisor. Hence, they forego competition with other 
franchisees and outlets owned by the franchisor 
(Justis and Judd, 1998: 4-11 ). Sequential multi-unit 
franchisees, on the other hand, develop all of their 
units subsequently as money allows and opportunities 
arise, with overlapping trade areas between such 
franchisees frequently occurring. Generally, individual 
area developers own more outlets than sequential multi-
unit operators, as the -expansion process for the 
sequential multi-unit franchisee is usually a slower one. 
The conflict prevention potential of area development 
franchising has spurred its growth in particular (Kauf-
mann and Kim, 1993 and 1995; Zeller, Achabal, and 
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Brown, 1980). Consequently, the growth of multi-unit 
franchising as an aggregate is a result of various factors, 
among them: 
(a) systematic and obligatory growth of area developers; 
(b) prevention of territorial encroachment through 
exclusive trade areas for area developers; and 
(c) incremental, but widespread growth of sequential 
owners. 
In the subsequent section, the focus will be on the issue 
of why individuals engage in multi-unit franchising. 
Multi-unit franchisees have become such large and 
pervasive marketing institutions that this question seems 
warranted. In contrast to the traditional research per-
spective taken in marketing, in which the role of the 
franchisor has been scrutinized for the most part, the 
viewpoint of the franchisee is emphasized here. 
The multi-unit franchising paradox 
From a theoretical perspective the phenomenon of multi-
unit franchising seems counterintuitive. The main reason 
for the existence of franchising in the literature from the 
franchisor's point of view has been attributed to the 
advantage of owner attention, ie the increased profitabil-
ity that a franchised outlet generates, based on the 
semi-independent owner's motivation compared with a 
company-owned onit operated by a hired manager. 
Owner attention as the core justification from the 
franchisor's point of view goes back ultimately to 
agency theory as the main theoretical concept (Carney 
and Gedajlovic, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Kmeger, 1991). In the case of multi-unit franchising, the 
franchisee owns more than one unit. The individual units 
of these mini-chains are operated by employee store 
managers. Hence, from the franchisor's perspective, the 
traditional advantage of owner attention seems to 
disappear. Therefore, it seems as if the franchisor ought 
to be leery of the level of motivation created by multi-
unit franchising. 
From the franchisee's perspective, it seems that an 
entrepreneur who has the financial resources available to 
become a multi-unit franchisee ought at least to consider 
alternative opportunities to invest her/his money. 
Compared with single-unit franchising, multi-unit 
franchising seems to offer the advantage of scale 
economies, and often appears to provide franchisees 
with the opportunity to draw on expertise from existing 
outlets. Nonetheless, a multi-unit franchisee would be 
investing in a business that was to a large extent control-
led by the franchisor as the system's sole decision 
maker, and in which the franchisee had to make substan-
tial payments such as entrance fees and/or monthly 
royalty payments to the franchisor. Other opportunities 
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for potential multi-unit franchisees to invest their money, 
such as the securities or real estate markets, may appear 
equally profitable, given the variability of returns across 
franchise systems. Hence, alternatives to multi-unit 
franchising might represent equally enticing investment 
options. The fact that multi-unit franchising has emerged 
as the dominant phenomenon in the US franchising 
industry despite the mentioned drawbacks is coined here 
the 'multi-unit franchising paradox'. It seems as if, for 
the potential franchisee and the franchisor, the multi-unit 
franchising concept might be part of a considered set of 
alternative options. By no means, however, does multi-
unit franchising seem to present itself as the clear 
superior choice. The three questions in Box 1 are 
suggested to provide overarching themes and guidance 
to the basic question of 'what is the justification of 
multi-unit franchising hom the franchisee's point of 
view?' The third suggestion will be pursued further, 
while the first two suggestions are meant to encourage 
further research. 
Why multi-unit franchising? 
(l) Perhaps tor the same reasons as single-unit 
owners, with the only difference being more 
money at the franchisee's discretion? 
(2) Perhaps the belief prevails that, being big-
ger than single-unit operators, multi-unit 
owners might be able to 'beat the game'? 
(3) Perhaps it is a completely different 'philo-
sophical' orientation? That Is, some multi-unit 
franchisees might consider themselves more 
entrepreneurial than others. 
To try to answer the general question, 'why multi-unit 
franchising?', three possible answers seem to emerge 
from the literature: 
(I) Single-unit franchisees may be so eager to get into 
business for themselves that they become risk-
indifferent, thus truly lowering the cost of capital 
relative to a vertically integrated system. This 
argument is extended by saying that multi-unit 
franchisees are no different from single-unit 
franchisees in that respect, indeed, they are just like 
single-unit operators, except that they have more 
money to invest. 
(2) Multi-unit operators believe that, because they are 
entering in a bigger way, they can 'beat the system' 
by garnering advantages inherent in larger, geo-
graphically dispersed operations. 
(3) The same 'experts' who have argued that multi-unit 
operations do not make a lot of sense have also 
argued that 'entrepreneurship' has no place in the 
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study of franchisees. Why would anyone who has 
any entrepreneurial spirit want to take on a role that 
is almost indistinguishable from that of an em-
ployee? However, it may be that the entrepreneurial 
spirit lives in multi-unit operators and, specifically, 
in those that develop sequentially. 
Entrepreneurship as a motivator 
The franchising literature has borrowed from fields such 
as entrepreneurship (Knight, 1984) and psychology 
(Felstead, 1991; Mescon and Montanari, 1981) to 
suggest various reasons for entering into the franchise 
business from the single-unit franchisee's perspective. 
Franchise owners often vehemently deny that their 
franchise engagement is based on the monetary earning 
potential. The opportunity to become one's own boss 
and the hands-on work experience as a type of entrepre-
neurial self-fulfilment, bolstered by the perceived 
security of the franchisor's proven business fonnat, 
trademark and assistance, is a common justification for 
single-unit operators (Elango and Fried, 1997). The fact 
that the financial aspect of franchising is truly secondary 
is supported by the fact that it is often previously highly 
paid executives who leave their jobs to become 
franchisees. Most of this research (Anderson, Condon, 
and Dunkelberg, 1992; Knight, 1984; Mescon and 
Montanari, 1981) is inconclusive in terms of distinguish-
ing franchisees from independent entrepreneurs based 
on personality traits or socioeconomic variables (see 
also Ginsberg and Buchholtz, 1989 for a comparison of 
entrepreneurs with non-entrepreneurs). One issue that 
has not been researched, however, is the distinction of 
different multi~unit franchisee types from each other. 
As described earlier, an area development contract 
entails the obligation to complete the entire mini-chain 
by the end of the contract period. Hence, in contrast to 
sequential multi-unit franchisees, area developers have 
to start their endeavour with a very good estimate of the 
whole investment to be incurred. Morse (1999) reports 
that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) defines a 
franchisee as a 'sophisticated investor' if s/he invests 
more than $1.5 million in a franchise. Area development 
franchisees have to decide from the outset of their 
endeavour whether it appears to be a worthwhile 
investment. Hence, although a sequential multi-unit 
franchisee and an area developer seem equivalent in 
terms of their current size and structure, the process that 
has led them to where they are appears quite different. A 
sequential multi-unit franchisee expands on the basis of 
emergtng market opportunities paired with sufficient 
eanungs that allow such a step. As a new opportunity to 
expand opens up, a sequential multi-unit franchisee will 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not to take 
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advantage of it. Livesay (1982: 12) calls an individual 
who 'perceives a market opportunity and assembles the 
assets necessary to exploit it' an 'entrepreneur'. Palmer 
(1970/71) points out that entrepreneurs do not tend to 
work harder because of financial incentives, but that it is 
their intrinsic motivation which drives them. This 
appears to be in accordance with many sequential 
owners' strongly held beliefs that a continued presence 
in their stores is mandatory for persistent success. In 
addition, the entrepreneurship literature often describes 
the motivation of entrepreneurs as a type of emotional 
fulfilment stemming from a long-held desire to become 
an entrepreneur. 10 own one's own business, and to be 
one's own boss, appear for many entrepreneurs as life-
long dreams, which finally become fulfilled through the 
opening of their own enterprise. Therefore, an 'entrepre-
neurial motivation' as it relates to franchisees appears to 
emanate from two sources, job involvement and emo-
tional fulfilment. It is suggested here that, particularly 
for sequential multi-unit franchisees, such an entrepre-
neurial motivation might be the driving force behind 
their involvement as multi-unit owners. 
Past and future research 
Multi-unit franchising has emerged as the current 'hot' 
trend in the domestic franchising industry. The academic 
literature on multi-unit franchising in marketing, 
however, is still in its embryonic stage (Table!), and has 
only emerged over the past few years, mainly based on 
work by Kaufmann, Lafontaine and their colleagues 
(Kalnins and Lafontaine, 1996; Kaufmann and Dant, 
1996; Kaufmann and Kim, 1993 and 1995; Kaufmann 
and Lafontaine, 1994; Robicheaux et al, 1994). Most of 
this research has focused on the franchisor's perspective. 
The empirical testing of multi-unit franchising research 
is just emerging, and has so far answered questions that 
are very limited in scope, such as issues of growth or 
system-wide adaptability (see Table I). Bradach (1995), 
Kaufmann and Dant (1996) and Kaufmann and Kim 
(1993 and 1995) found that the tranchisor's chief 
advantage in multi-unit franchising compared with 
single-unit franchising lies in the increased growth rates 
of such systems. The underlying assumption in this 
context appears to be that accelerated growth means 
rapid revenue increases for the franchisor, as each new 
outlet puts more royalties and fees into the franchisor's 
pocket. 
Kaufmann and Stanworth (1995), Peterson and Dant 
(1990) and Stanworth and Kaufmann (1996) provide 
some of the few acadentic attempts to organize per-
ceived advantages from the franchisee's perspective. 
These studies, however, only consider the single-unit 
franchise context. The literature on multi-unit 
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Table 1. Major findings of multi-unit franchising studies. 
Authors 
Bradach (1995) 
Kalnins and Lafontaine (1996) 
Kaufmann and Dan! (1996) 
Kaufmann and Kim (1 993) 
Kaufmann and Kim (1995) 
Robicheaux, Dant, and 
Kaufmann (1994) 
Major findings 
> 130 semi-structured interviews with corporate and unit personnel of five large franchise 
systems 
Multi-unit franchisees outperform single-unit franchisees, most importantly in terms at unit 
growth and system-wide adaptation to the competition 
Single-unit franchisees prevail compared with multi-unit franchisees in terms of local 
responsiveness 
Both types meet the challenge of uniformity equally well 
Survey of 3,400 restaurants of the six largest Texan fast-food chains 
Geographic distance and sharing of market boundaries increases likelihood of multi-unit 
franchising 
Differences in demographic characteristics decrease likelihood of 
multi-unit franchising 
Survey of 125 International Franchise Association franchisors 
The greater the proportion of a system's multi~unit franchisees, the faster it 
grows compared with traditional franchise systems 
Level of a franchisor's continued commitment to franchise is negatively 
related to the number of outlets per franchisee and the ability to obtain capital elsewhere 
Combination of agency and capital acquisition arguments as partial explanation for 
franchising 
Survey of 169 International Franchise Association franchisors 
Area development franchising and subfranchising are associated with higher growth rates 
than single-unit franchising 
Systems employing area development have a higher proportion of franchiser~owned 
stores than those employing subfranchising 
Survey of 169 International Franchise Association franchisors 
Franchise systems using multi-unit franchising grow faster (in units) than those that do not 
Causality between rapid growth and multi-unit franchising remains unclear 
Survey of 160 fast-food franchisors drawn from Info Franchise Annual 
On average, 33% of all franchisees are multi-unit operators 
Among those multi-unit operators, nearly a fifth on average have area development 
agreements 
Area agreements are more common in chicken and full menu restaurant franchise 
systems than among other segments 
The greater the respondents' perceptions of franchisee and franchisor management 
difficulties with multi-unit operations, the lower the percentage of operators with area 
development agreements 
tranchising has neglected to a large extent the 
franchisee's perspective, and her/his motivation to 
engage in this endeavour. Hence, at this time no theoreti-
cal framework is known which exposes reasons that lead 
to multi-unit franchising from the tfanchisee's point of 
view. One can plausibly conjecture that asserting a 
single fheoretical framework for predicting why certain 
multi-unit franchisees see certain advantages as salient 
would be a very difficult task, since a large number of 
situational, personality and economic correlates are 
likely to influence such perceptions. Such a framework 
can only be developed gradually, and this article is 
meant to encourage research in this direction. 
motivations, with quantitative measures to explore the 
salience and distribution of the phenomenon of a 
'driving philosophy' among franchisees. 
Research on the franchisee's perspective has been 
constrained in the past by the cautiousness and even 
overzealousness of franchisees, fearful of disclosing 
potentially confidential information pertaining to fhe 
agreement with the franchisor. Further, most empirical 
research on franchisees, and on franchising in general, 
was system-specific, ie it was restricted to the operation 
of one particular franchise system (Kaufmann, 1988; 
Kaufmann and Lafontaine, 1994). Future research in this 
area needs to address these issues in an effort to enhance 
fhe generalizability of findings across system bounda-
ries, while convincing franchisee respondents of the 
value that their contributions might provide to a deeper 
understanding of their respective motivations. It seems 
that such a study could be conducted, for example, in the 
In the future, research in this area needs to provide 
empirical insights into the suggested 'entrepreneurial 
drive' as a motivator for franchise owners. Such efforts 
need to combine qualitative efforts in order to gain a 
better comprehension of multi-unit franchisee 
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fast-food industry, which has not only served as a 
sample for most of the published research on 
fninChising, but also seems to provide the required 
variance of ownership patterns to compare area develop-
ers and sequential operators. The frequent use of the 
fast-food industry in the tranchising realm ought to 
prove valuable, as new findings could be validated in the 
faCe-_ of prior studies. Considering the recent rise in 
prominence of entrepreneurship-related research across 
business disciplines, the exploration of the emergence of 
such pervasive marketing institutions as franchise 
businesses of different types appears to warrant attention 
by scholars of entrepreneurship and franchising issues in 
particular. 
Conclusion 
To summarize, it has been argued that multi-unit 
franchisees in general, and sequential multi-unit opera-
tors in particular, represent a growing proportion of the 
franchising industry. From the franchisor's perspective, 
multi-unit franchisees do not seem to make a lot of 
conceptual sense, except that they seem to allow for 
faster growth of the system. However, sequential multi-
unit operators do not seem to represent that same 
8.dvantage since sequencing is a strategy most often 
found in relatively well established systems. In addition, 
.the franchisee's perspective has received very little 
attention in the academic franchising literature. Given 
that tranchise systems inherently give fhe franchisee 
only limited control of her/his own business, no opportu-
nity to retrieve any goodwill fhat the business may 
develop, and cost a significant percentage of the gross 
revenue into the bargain, one has to ask why anyone 
would ever become a franchisee. This phenomenon is 
known as the 'multi-unit franchising paradox' in this 
article. 
Some have argued fhat franchisees are 'buying jobs'. 
Wh!!e fhat may be tme for a single-unit owner, it does 
not answer the question for the area developer who, 
presumably, has enough capital to provide other alterna-
tives. This paper encourages research that might shed 
more hght on the question of why multi-unit franchisees 
are mot~vated to engage in this endeavour, and suggests 
t)lat an entrepreneurial drive' might add to fhe explana-
twn of the multi-unit ownership phenomenon. 
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